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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND IN A FEDERAL EUROPE*
John W. Bridge**
THE RULE

OF LA W IN THE UNITED

KINGDOM

The key concept on which this paper is based is that governmental power
derives from the law and is necessarily limited by the law. A rider to that
concept is that there is an area of freedom into which the law should not
intervene other than to ensure that the freedom is guaranteed. This concept can
be expressed by the term "the rule of law' or, perhaps more accurately, by the
term "government under law". In a society which holds to that concept, a
principal purpose of Lhe constitution is so to constrain the exercise of governmental power as to underwrite basic freedoms.
Notions such as these have been an important part of the British political tradition for many centuries. Bracton, writing in the mid-13th Century,
said "The King must not be under man but under God and under the law,
because the law makes the King ...Nothing is more fitting for a sovereign to
live by the laws, nor is there greater sovereignty than to gov.ern according to
law, and he ought properly to yield to the law what the law has bestowed on
him, for the law makes him King."1 The sentiments expressed in that passage
reflect the universal and perennial question of the proper relationship between
government and the law. As it was put in The Federalist some five centuries
after Bracton, "In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependency on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government;
but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."2
The principle "auxiliary precaution" is the law administered by the courts.
The United Kingdom has a long and proud history of safeguarding individual liberties. Documents like Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1688 have
come to be regarded as touchstones of such basic principles as fair trial and
parliamentary democracy. The traditional common law language of liberties
rather than rights is more than a semantic quibble; it encapsulates the United
Kingdom approach. The United Kingdom citizen is at liberty to do whatever
*
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he or she wishes provided that it does not offend against a positive law to the
contrary. Thus liberties in the United Kingdom pivot on the principle of legality. Government only has those powers which are given to it by the law. As a
Seventeenth
Century English writer put it, "be you never so high, the law is
above you".3
This notion of government under law is reinforced by the inherent jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts to review government action at the suit
of the citizen to see if it is justified both substantively
and procedurally
by
positive law. If it is not, then the action is legally null and void. In modern
times a striking instance of that jurisdiction
has been the development
by the
courts of far reaching powers to strike down the acts of government and other
public authorities on grounds that they are ultra vires, that is beyond the legal
powers conferred on those authorities.4 In the context of individual liberties,
which will be the focus of this paper, the famous remedy of habeas corpus
provides a good example. Whenever anyone is detained involuntarily
other
than by a judgement of a court the onus is on the gaoler to justify the detention by reference to positive law, if he cannot then the prisoner will go frce.5
Thus the practical enjoyment of liberties by United Kingdom citizens has always been dependent on the pro-liberty stance typically adopted by the judiciary. Applications
to a judge concerning the liberty of the subject have a long
tradition of priority over all other applications.6 A representative
statement of
the role and responsibility
of the judiciary in such cases is that "the courts are
in general the ultimate custodians of the rights and liberties of the subject
whatever his status and however attenuated those rights and liberties may be
as a result of some punitive or some other process".?
The judicial protection of individual liberties through the common law
must, of course, be placed in the constitutional
context of the United Kingdom.
It is notorious that the United Kingdom does not have a constitution
in the
written, codified sense of that term. It is even more notorious that there are no
legal limits to or constants on the legislative authority of the United Kingdom
Parliament
Further, that authority is effectively exercised and controlled through
the parliamentary
majority of the Government in power. All of this has implications for individual liberties and their judicial protection .. Some of these
implications
are positive in the sense that important protection of some fundamental rights is afforded through parliamentary
legislation,
for example in
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respect police powers, ethnic groups and equality between the sexes.s Other
implications however may be negative. These are not generally in the form of
legislation expressly curbing liberties,9 but rather in the incidental and perhaps
unforeseen consequences of Parliament conferring wide discretionary powers
on government which, in their practical execution, may encroach on individual
liberties.
Here, again, the judges hold the key through their judicial review power
over Government action. This is subject to the judges' obligation to implement
faithfully the express and unambiguous intentions of Parliament as indicated
in legislation. But, in carrying out that obligation the judges approach the task
of statutory interpretation in the light of a number of presumptions which tend
to promote individual liberty: a presumption against ousting the jurisdiction
of the courts; a presumption in favour of the strict interpretation of penal
statutes; a presumption against interference with vested rights.10 While Parliament can, of course, legislate contrary to all or any of these presumption, it
will require a clear expression of the intention to do so.
THE RULE

OF LAW IN A FEDERAL

EUROPE

There are a variety of views on the criteria for determining whether an
association of states is a federation. That debate will not be joined here. It is
assumed to be common ground that there is not, as yet, a European federation
in the sense of a "United States of Europe". But what has been taking place in
Western Europe since the 1950s is a far reaching and evolving experiment in
federalisation. Through the exercise of their treaty making powers European
State have established and joined associations which impose obligations of
federal significance on their members. The most obvious of these is the European Community.ll This is a new polity which has clear federal characteristics
and potential: the transfer of sovereign powers from the member states to the
Union: the adoption of common policies and laws to implement them; the
acceptance of the supremacy of community law over incompatible national
law; and the constitutional jurisdiction of the Community's Court of Justice
over the member statesP The other experiment in federalisation is in the
context of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free8
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doms (hereafter the European convention) drawn up in 1950 under the aegis of
tbe Council of Europe. Accession to the European Convention involves acceptance of international
legal obligations to uphold its substantive provisions and
to do so subject to another constitutional
jurisdiction,
that of the European
court of Human right. Again, the doctrine of supremacy is implicit in these
arrangements.
Both of these experiments in federalisation are firmly based on the principles of government under law and the protection of individual liberties. The
European community clearly only has those powers which have been transferred to it by the member states. The institutions of the Community only have
those powers which have been conferred on them by the constituent Treaties.
They may only act within those powers. Issues of competence are subject to
the final and exclusi vee jurisdiction
of the court of J ustice.13 As far as individual liberties are concerned, the Treaties expressly recognise such principles
as legality, equality of treatment, compensation
for loss, procedural protection
and democratic control.14 In addition to those express principles, the European
Community has both politically and legally proclaimed its commitment
to adhere to fundamental rights derived from the constitutions
of the member states
and from the European Convention.15 As far as that Convention itself is concerned, it is emphatically
based on the propositions
(i) that the exercise of
governmental
power in the acceding states is subject to the limitations
imposed by the Convention and (ii) that their constitutions
and laws must secure
the Convention rights and feedoms to everyone within their jurisciction.16
THE UNITED

KINGDOM

IN A FEDERAL

EUROPE

The United Kingdom internally, despite its component historical kingdoms, is not in any sense a federal state. Power is concentrated
in the national
governmental
institutions.
The institutions of local government in the United
Kingdom exist and possess power on the basis of authority delegated for the
time being through legislation of the national Parliament. But externally tbe
United Kingdom, while not yet part of a federation, is a participant in both of
the experiments
in federalisation
referred to earlier: it is a member of the
European Community and it has acceded to the European Convention including its judicial provisions. Therefore government under law in the United Kingdom
now has European dimensions. In the context of individual freedoms, this bas
certain implications.
Given that the protection of fundamental rights is a con-
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cern of the European Community, the United Kingdom's
duty to implement
Community law and to recognise its supremacy bears on the judicial protection
of individual liberties in the United Kingdom. As far as the European Convention is concerned, the United Kingdom is under the rights and freedoms set out
in the Convention.
The United Kingdom is one of a small number of participating states in which the Convention is not part of domestic law, although
that does not exclude all reference to it by the United Kingdom judges. The
United Kingdom accepts the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Human
Rights. Thus, beyond the domestic context, government
under law and the
protection of individual liberties in the United Kingdom must also be considered in the wider European context.
It is a commonplace
that the participation
of the United Kingdom in
these experiments
in federalisation
is necessarily subject to the relevant principles of the Constitution
of the United Kingdom. Here two principles
are
particularly
significant: the totally unlimited nature of the law-making
power
of the United Kingdom Parliament and the dualist approach to treaties. The
issues raised by these principles are simple but of fundamental importance.
If
the domestic implementation
and enforcement
of international
legal obligations is dependent on incorporation
through national legislation,
and if the
entrenchment
of those obligations
is impossible because of the absence of
constraints on the legislature, can the observance of those obligations be guaranteed in the long-term? The confident answer is that they can be guaranteed
at a level that is at least as secure as that attained in those European states the
constitutions
of which contain catalogues of rights and are apparently more
conducive to such an outcome.
Here, as with many of the core principles of the Constitution
of the
United Kingdom, the answer lies not so much with the formal rules of law but
rather with the effect which binding rules of political practice have on the
operation of those rules, what are commonly called the Conventions
of those
rules, what are commonly called the Conventions
of the Constitution.
The
United Kingdom Constitution,
it has been said,"has always been predominatly
political rather than legal. To restrain parliamentary
legislation which might
interfere unduly with people's rights,the UK has generally been content to rely
on the good sense of politicians and the conventions
and social properties
which they are expected to observe".17
Therefore,
if the United Kingdom
Government
accepts obligations
which in turn call for the exercise of legislative restraint by the United Kingdom Parliament the exercise of the necessary
restraint will be effectively guaranteed in practice as long as the obligations
endure. An instructive example is provided by the emancipation
of the British
Empire. The various territories of the British Empire were granted political
independence
by Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament.
It was routinely

17
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recognised as a matter of law that the Parliament retained its legislative authority over those territories, but that as a matter of practical politics that
authority would never be exercised unless the territory in question requested

it. 18

The same practical approach, arising out of respect for obligations voluntarily undertaken, influences the legislative activity of the United Kingdom
Parliament vis-a-vis the European community. As a member of the European
community the United Kingdom has accepted and participates in a form of
two-tier government with an accompanying duality of legal orders. Policy making
and law-making are no longer the exclusive concern of the United Kingdom
Government and Parliament; significant areas of policy-making and law-making have been transferred to the institutions of the European Community, with
the important rider that such policy and law takes precedence over conflicting
domestic policy and law. In support of the political decision to join the community, the United Kingdom Parliament has, in effect, identified a field within
which community law will operate and within that field it has invariably refrained from exercising its own law-making power other than as required by
Community Law. A dramatic illustration of the efficacy of this self-denial is
that should it be discovered that an Act of Parliament may conflict with Community Law, the courts of the United Kingdom will suspend the operation of
that Act pending a final resolution of the issue.19
The various treaties establishing the European Community have been
subject to the process of incorporation into the domestic laws of the United
Kingdom by Parliamentary legislation.2o In such a situation there is a legal
structure within which a direct working relationship has been established and
developed between the Court of Justice of the European community and the
courts of the United Kingdom.21 The situation is different when treaty obligations have not been thus incorporated, as is the case with the European Convention. Then the terms of the treaty cannot be a direct source of law for the
courts of the United Kingdom.22 Harmony between the two legal orders in
such a situation can however be achieved by the operation of a number of

18
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factors. Parliamentary restraint again has a role to play to avoid the passing of
domestic legislation expressly contrary to the treaty obligations. That is reinforced by the courts adopting a strong presumption of interpretation that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to the treaty obligations of the
United Kingdom. This enables doubts concerning Parliament's intention to be
resolved in a pro-treaty way. In the case of the European Convention these
factors are supported by the United Kingdom's acceptance of the jurisdiction
of European Court of Human rights. Where the United Kingdom is adjudged to
have infringed the Convention, in addition to remedying the particular infraction the United Kingdom government or Parliament, as appropriate, will invariably take action or legislate to prevent the infringement recurring.23
The protection of individual liberties in the United Kingdom at the present
time is therefore achieved through an amalgam of United Kingdom law and
two concordant bodies of federalising European law. The rest of this paper
will consider the impact of that European law on the judicial protection of
individual liberties in the courts of United Kingdom.
INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED
PEAN COMMUNITY
CONTEXT

KINDGOM

IN THE EURO-

The treaties which originally established the European Community in
the 1950s did not in express terms address the issue of the protection of human
rights. This is in contrast with the near contemporary statute of the council of
Europe which includes in its aims "the maintenance and the further realization
of human rights and fundamental freedoms". 24This omission from the Community Treaties is no doubt party explained by the prior existence of the Council
of Europe and its adopti0n of the European convention. It also reflects the
initial perception of the aims of the European Community as being primarily
economic in character. But, as the Nineteenth Century British statesman Benjamin Disraeli once observed, "Civil rights partake, in some degree, of an
economical and, in some degree, certainly of a political character. They conduce
to the comfort, the security, and the happiness of the subject; and, at the same
time, are invested with a degree of sentiment which mere economical considerations do not involve".25
A comparable recognition that economic policy is likely to impinge on
the rights of citizens is echoed in many of the substantive provision of European Community treaties. Thus the Treaties contain express provision which
23
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accord respect to such rights as free movement of persons, equal treatment,
compensation
for harmful acts, and the resolution of legal disputes by a fair
procedure
before an independent
court. Z6 These undoubted rights, while reflecting the shared constitutional
traditions of the original Member States, did
not amount to a general catalogue of rights and were clearly conceived
as
promoting the economic objective of the Community. In other words the criteria for the production of those rights were not to be objective criteria but the
subjective criteria of the community itself. Concern for human rights in the
community was therefore orginally community focused and community-justified. This approach is encapsulated
in an early judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Community2? which declared that: "the system of law
under the Treaty is distinguished
from national law precisely because it does
not guarantee complete legal protection in a general clause ..... (T) he court had
to determine the limits of its .. .legal protection only in accordance
with the
words of the Treaty and not in accordance with national law".28
The Court of Justice is, however, the final arbiter of Community Law.
Community
Law is a law with a special purpose, that of implementing
and
guaranteeing
the socio-economic
policies which the Member States have accepted. That acceptance is recorded in treaties which are not the product of
legislative
processes but of political negotiation.
The results of that negotiation are expressed in several language versions each of which is of equal
authenticity.
The treaties are essentially traites cadres, framework
treaties.
This has led the Court of Justice in its interpretation
of the treaties to adopt a
teleological
or purposive approach.29 That approach goes beyond the literal
meaning of the words used to arrive at an interpretation
which promotes the
objectives and reflects the spirit of the treaties.30
A remarkable product of that approach has been a jurisprudence
constante, a body of consistent case law, to the effect that in addition to the rights
expressly conferred by the treaties and by Community legislation,
community
law includes a body of unwritten legal principles which are common to the
constitutional
and legal systems of the Member States. Those national principles have been said to "contribute
to forming that philosophical,
political
and legal substratum common to the Member States from which emerges through

26
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the case law a unwritten Community Law, one of the essential aims of which
is precisely to ensure the respect for the fundamental rights of the individual".3!
A practical consequence
of that doctrine from thee standpoint of community
Law is that the court of Justice will judge the validity of community legislation in terms of its compatibility
not only with the texts of Community Law
but also with fundamental
rights implicit in the community's
legal system.32
The law of the European community has therefore moved way from protecting
fundamental
rights from an exclusively Community prospective
to protecting
them for their own sake. A practical consequence for the individual community citizen, in view of the supremacy and unity of Community Law, is that in
matters falling within Community competence,
the rights of individuals
are
now ultimatley under the protection of Community Law and not of the constitutions of their own states. That consequence and the potentiality
for a "gap"
appearing between national standards of protection and the Community
standard has led to a further development in the case law.
In the search for common ground between the community and its member States, the Court of Justice now seeks evidence of human rights not only in
the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States but also in international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States
collaborated,
or of which they are signatories".33
All the existing Member
States are parties to the European Convention.The
more recent case law of the
Court of Justice shows that it turns to that Convention34 not only to supply
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community Law
but also to regard it as a direct source of Com unity Law. The Court of Justice
has gone so far as to say that a right expressed in the European convention "is
one of the fundamental
rights which ... are recognised by Community Law". 35
It is clear tbat in reaching such law of the European court of Justice gives due
regard to the case law of the European court of Human Rights.36 These developments have been confirmed and supported by both the political institutions
of the European Community37 and by the Member States.38 The end result has
been a series of judgments which have recognized and protected the right to
31
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property, the right to engage in economic activity (including the right to choose
and practise a trade or profession), the right to respect for private and family
life, the right to equality between the sexes in employment, the right to take
part in trade union activity, and freedom of religion.39
A consequence of this case law is that the European Convention is a
constraint upon the legislative and administrative action of the European community. An action by an institution of the Community which fails to take into
account rights guaranteed by the European Convention is subject to annulment
by the Court of Justice on that ground. Thus in a recent case the Court decided
that a retroactive penal provisions in a piece of community legislation could
not be upheld because "the principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is ... enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention ... as a
fundamental right which takes its place among the general principles of law
whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice".4o
What is the relevance of all of this to the judicial protection of individual liberties in the United Kingdom? In the first place, where community
Law in express terms creates rights for the individual, the domestic law of the
United Kingdom must give effect to such rights. In a very recent case the
House of Lords accepted an argument that provisions of an Act of Parliament
which did not extend unfair dismissal and redundancy rights to part-time workers
were discriminatory and incompatible with Commnity Law which gives equal
employment protection to full time and part time workers. The House of Lords
issued a declaration to that effect.41 The United Kingdom government has
acknowledged its obligation to change the law and part-time workers have
been provided with a legal base for the enforcement of their rights in the
United Kingdom courts. This has led an authoritative British newspaper to
conclude that the House of Lords has assumed a constitutional jurisdiction to
declare Acts of Parliament invalid when they conflict with Community Law.42
Secondly, given that the European Convention is a constraint on the
European Community it follows that it must also be a constraint on the Member states through the mediation of Community Law in general and the case
law of the Court of Justice in particular.43 Thus the Court of Justice has in-

39
40
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this article.
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voked principles in the European Convention to restrict the activities of the
authorities of the Member States.44 In such cases the Court not only draws on
the Convention as a source of human rights principles but it also suggests that
the courts of the Member States must interpret and apply community Law in
the light of those principles.
That latter expectation impinges directly on the courts of the United
Kingdom. The United Kingdom has accepted through treaty obligation and
implemented through national legislation that its courts must determine the
meaning, effect and validity of Community law in accordance with the case
law of the Court of Justice.45 Since the rights protected by the European Convention are factors which the Court of Justice takes into account in determining such issues, the courts of the United Kindgom must also take them into
account. This is clearly illustrated by two cases in which a United Kingdom
court sought a ruling from the Court of Justice on a point of Community
Law.46 In the first of those cases the Court ruled that penal provisions of a
United Kindgom law could not acquire validity as a result of a retroactive rule
of Community Law because the principal against retroactivity in Article 7 of
the European Convention is a principle of Community Law.47 In the other case
the court ruled that a claim that an executive decision by a public body was
conclusive evidence that a particular principle, of human rights could be derogated from offended against another principle, namely the right to an effective
judicial remedy enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention.48
The judicial protection of individual liberties in the United Kingdom is
therefore ultimately subject to the rules of Community Law which uphold and
protect human rights. While the Court of Justice has no power to evaluate
against community standards United Kingdom laws lying outside the framework of Community Law, it will do so with regard to laws within that framework. The human rights thus subject to this external, federalising guarantee
are at present limited to socio-economic activities. But those activities are
broader than maybe realised. Their current scope includes employment, sex
discrimination, food, medicine, the professions and transport. Other factors are
also tending both to extend and to consolidate the concern of the European
community with human rights: progress towards economic and monetary union49,
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the creation of the European Economic Area bringing more parties to the European Convention within the ambit of Community Law,50 and the prospect that
the European Community may eventually accede in its own name to the European Convention.51
INDIVIDUAL
EUROPEAN

LIBERTIES
CONVENTION

IN THE UNITED

KINGDOM

AND THE

The effect of membership of the Euopean Community on the judicial
protection of individual liberties in the United Kingdom is selective and largely
indirect. The parallel effect of acceptance of the European Convention is comprehensivee
and prima facie direct. The obligation on the United Kingdom to ensure to
everyone within its jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention could be realised directly by United Kindgom courts. But, as has already
been mentioned,
in the context of a dualist approach to treaties the United
Kingdom has not incorporated
the Convention into national law.52 The European Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are
not therefore direct sources of law for United
Kingdom legislation and the
judicial exposition of the common law.
Two key principles make such references possible. The first is the presumption that the United Kingdom Parliament will not legislate contrary to the
treaty obligations of the United Kingdom unless such an intention is stated in
clear and express terms. The second is the assertion that there are no differences in principle between United Kingdom law on human rights and the European convention.
In other words, the United Kingdom's continued acceptance
of the Convention is based on the assumption (a) that the citizens of the United

50

The Preamble
to the Agreement
on the European Economic Area 1992 refers to human
rights, common values and the judicial protection of the rights of individuals.
Three of
the parties to the EEA Agreement
(Austria, Finland and Sweden)
in fact became full
members of the European community
on I January 1995.

51

This was first proposed in 1979; see Bulletin of the European communities, supplement
2179. Also see Dauses, op.cit., at 413-417.
the idea has recently
been revived
with
consideration
being given to seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice on the matter;
see EUROPE, No.611S (n.s.), 1 December 1993, at I. The United Kingdom government
is, however,
opposed to the idea; see 'United Kingdom Materials
On International
Law
1992" LXIII British Yearbook of [nlemational Law, 624-625,(1992).
While the focus of
this paper is the protection
of human rights by the courts of the United Kingdom,
it
should also be remembered
that natural and legal persons have direct rights of action in
the Court of Justice against Community
institutions
to uphold rights and seek compensation for breach of rights. Direct actions also lie against Member States themselves.
On
these matters see Lasok & bridge, op.cit.,at 251-272.
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see: Robertson, Freedom. the Individual and the Law (7th ed 1993) chapter 12;Feldman,op.cit.,at
75-SS;and Binghom,"The
European Convention On Human rights:
Time to Incorporate",
109 Law Quarterly Review 390 (1993); Pannick,"Time
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Kingdom should enjoy the rights and freedoms expressed therein, and (b) that
the Convention as a series of propositions represents legal norms and values
which are either in or are inherent in the law of the United Kingdom.53
Two possibilities flow from these principles: that the interpretation of
United Kingdom legislation should be approached from the position of its
compatibility with the European Convention; and that the common law should
be expounded and developed so as to reflect the norms and values of the
Convention. This conceptual framework has been articulated by an eminent
member of the English judiciary in the following terms:
The position ... is that if there is any ambiguity in our statutes or
uncertainty
in our law, then these courts can look to the (European) Convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertainty, seeking always to bring them into harmony with it ... But I
would dispute altogether that the Convention is part of our law.
Treaties ... do not become part of our law until they are made law
by Parliament. 54

The reference to "statutes" in this statement is understood to apply to
both primary and secondary legislation, i.e. Acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation made under the authority of Acts of Parliament. The reference
to "our law" means the common law, i.e. the law to be found in judicial
decisions. The case in which that statement was made illustrates the first of
those possibilities. In it, and in subsequent cases, the court relied on Article 8
of the European Convention, concerning the right to family life, as an aid to
interpretation.55

A further illustration and endorsement of that possibility is provided by
a case in which it was argued that there was a conflict between a directi ve
made under the terms of an Act56 which authorised the imposition of a ban on
the broadcasting of material by people belonging to proscribed organizations
and Article 10(1) of the European convention which guarantees the freedom of
expressionY In the Court of Appeal58 it was observed that "in most cases the
English courts will be wholly unconcerned with the terms of the Convention.

53
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the sole exception is when the terms of ... legislation are fairly capable of
bearing two meanings and the court, in pursuance of its duty to apply domestic
law, is concerned to divine and define its true and only meaning".59 "Thus the
courts ... now refer to the relevant provisions of the Convention; and to the
judgments of the European court of Human rights, interpreting those provisions, for the purpose of ensuring, where possible, that our domestic law is in
conformity with the Convention". But it "would be a usurpation of the legislative power of Parliament for the court to do more than to construe the legislation which Parliament has passed in order to establish its meaning".6o These
themes were reiterated on a further and final appeal to the House of Lords. In
the leading judgment it was held that "it is a constitutional principle that if
Parliament has legislated and the words of the statute are clear, the statute
must be applied even if its application is in breach of international law". But,
equally, it was held tbat it is "well settled that tbe Convention may be deployed for tile purpose of the resolution of an ambiguity in English primary or
subordinate legislation".61 With regard to the Act in issue there was no possible amiguity in the words used therfore no reference to the Convention was
necessary. The final decision that the issuing of the directive was reasonable
also bears the implication that it came within the terms of Article 10(2) of the
Convention, which authorises restrictions to the freedom of expression in order to uphold competing public interests
A further implication which may be drawn from the latter point is that
the law of the United Kingdom shares the values of the European Convention.
As a judge involved in the Brind case put it: "you have to look hard and long
before you can detect any difference between the English common law and the
principles set out in the Convention, at least if the Convention is viewed through
English judicial eyes" .62This provides the basis for the second possibility that
the Convention and its case law may be used to inform the exposition and
development of the common law can when there is uncertainty concerning that
law. The Common Law still has the capacity for clarification and gtrowth.
Contemporary case law shows that by building on existing principle the Common Law respond to the expectations of modern society.63 lust as such developments can be influenced by drawing on the case law of other common law
jurisdictions64 on the grounds of shared values, so there is no obstacle in principle to similar use being made of European Convention material.

59
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(1991) 1 A.C. at 718, per Lord Donaldson M.R.
Ibid., at 725 and 726,per Gibson L.J.
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Ibid., at 760,per Lord Ackner.
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Ibid., at 717 ,per Lord Donaldson M.R.
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This possibility has only been recognised in recent times. While it has
great potential for harmonising the law of the United Kingdom with the European Convention its rate of progress is dependent on judicial attitudes and the
incidence of cases. It is clearly no substitute for the incorporation of the Convention into domestic law. But there are indications that United Kingdom judges
are prepared to adopt such a course of action. In a case concerning the contiIlUing duty of confidentiality under English law owed by a former member of
the security services whose memoirs had already been published in other countries, the trial judge employed Convention criteria in balancing the competing
public interests involved.65 Although on appeal the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords did not in terms employ those criteria, their use was not questioned in confirming the judge's decision that the confidentiality of the material had been compromised.66 In another case, the issue was raised whether a
local government authority could bring an action for defamation arising out of
statements reflecting on its governmental f~nctions or whether such an action
would be an unacceptable fetter on the freedom of speech.67 Both the Court of
Appeal and the House of Lords agreed that it was of the highest public importance that a governmental body should be open to uninhibited public criticism.
Therefore it had no right at common law to bring an action in defamation since
the threat of such an action would have an inhibiting effect on the freedom of
speech. The Court of Appeal reached that conclusion principally by reference
to Article 10 of the European Convention.68 In giving judgment in the House
of Lords the same conclusion was reached upon the common law of England
without reference to the Convention, but with the comment that in the field of
freedom of speech there was no difference in principle between English law
and the Convention.69 A Court of Appeal judge has also stated, in terms which
do not imply any doubt, that even when parties do not specifically rely on the
Convention "in all cases which involve a proposed restriction on the right of
free speech the court is concerned when exercising its discretion to consider
whether the suggested restraint is necessary". 70 This clearly suggests that in
expounding the common law on human rights in a field in which there is
common ground with the European Convention United Kingdom courts should
always have regard to the Convention.
65
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66
67
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What appears to be emerging from these cases is a common law principle that where there is an alleged governmental
invasion of individual liberty, the courts in evaluating whether that invasion is legally justified should
do so with reference to the standards of the European Convention.?1 Implicit in
that principle is that a different and higher standard of legality should be
applied in cases alleging a breach of human rights than in cases alleging a
breach of human rights than in cases challenging Governmental
action on other
grounds. "Public bodies and private persons", it has recently been said, "are
both governed by the law, but the principles governing their relationship
with
it are wholly different. Private persons can do anything that the law does not
prohibit. But the rule is opposite for public bodies, and is that any action has
to be justified by positive law".72 If the principles differ in that sense, then
that difference should also be reflected in the standard of protection of the
rights of private persons in their relations with public bodies. Recourse by
United Kingdom courts to the law of the European convention is helping to
realise that objective.
CONCLUSION
Government
under law in the United Kingdom as we approach the 21st
Century is seen not only as continuing to depend on the traditional principles
of the United Kingdom constitution but also as being significantly
influenced
by the United Kingdom's
participation
in European federalisation.
In terms of
the traditional protection of individual liberties, it can still be concluded that
substance is at least as important as from and that practical guarantees
of
human rights can be at least as effective as solemn written declarations.
Further, that the concept of constitutionality
as a guarantor of human rights is not
necessarily
an exclusively
legal concept but may legitimately
include mature
and firmly established political practice.
With regard to European fcderalisation,
it can be concluded
that the
beneficial and harmonising
effect of a federal structure on the protection
of
individual
liberties can be achieved through the treaty-making
process and
with regard to states with diverse historical and legal traditions provided they
share the same basic values and commitment. It is also clear that a gradual and
progressive
process of federalisation
can be a strong and positive influence in
the protection of human rights at the level of the individual. Indeed, a commentator on the law relating to individual liberties in the United Kingdom has
recently summarised
the influence of these federalising
processes in the following terms: "It can confidently be asserted that such improvement
in Civil
Liberties as have been achieved in the past decade have come about more as a
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result of Britain's obligations under the European Convention on Human rights
and the Treaty of Rome73 than from initiatives by its own Government or by its
elected Members of Parliament" .74 As a result of these associations
with European organizations,
and through them with continental European constitutional
and legal traditions, another commentator has detected a "gradual development
of rights-consciousness,
as distinct from liberty-consciousness"
in the United
Kingdom.75 In other words, a move away from the traditional notion of the
residual freedom of the individual towards a notion of positive rights which
the law should protect.
But, as always, whether in the domestic United Kingdom or European
contexts, there can be no effective guarantee of individual liberties without an
independent
judiciary with the highest possible professional
standards. That
remains an absolute necessity.
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